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Arts Education:
A Philanthropic Priority?
Abstract
Through restricted donations, donors to private, independent not-for-profit US art
museums are able to affect the prioritization of museum activities. Using annual
data from museums’ Form 990s and AAMD survey responses, I test whether
restricted giving affects a museum’s educational programming by analyzing the
effect of restricted assets on education department performance indicators. I find
that a percentage point increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of
total assets is associated with a 0.1876 percentage point increase in education
expenses as a share of total expenses. Through qualitative informational
interviews, I recognize this impact as evidence that arts education is central to the
purpose of museums in the twenty-first century.
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gratitude for Professor Samara Gunter’s guidance through the honors research process, Professor Dan LaFave’s
programming and coding assistance, the Colby College Museum of Art’s entertaining of my museum curiosities,
Ashley Early’s help facilitating data compilation, the Colby College Division of Student and College
Advancement’s funding support of my data collection through GuideStar, the Colby College Center for the Arts and
Humanities’ funding support of my data processing, Provost Margaret McFadden’s funding support of my travel to
conduct informational interviews with museum educators, the Colby College Department of Library Services’
financial assistance in securing access to IRS tax documents, AAMD Executive Director Alison Wade’s generosity
in offering me access to rich AAMD annual survey data, Bill Layton’s insight into the development needs of notfor-profit institutions, Rebekah Beaulieu’s objective advice, Professor Amy Whitaker’s expertise at the intersection
between art and business, Professor David Yermack’s encouragement to research the not-for-profit sector, and
museum staff from across the Northeast who generously shared their time and knowledge with me.
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I. Introduction
Until now, research on how donors influence not-for-profit activities has focused on the
financial reporting practices and spending decisions of not-for-profit institutions when
constrained by restricted gifts. The existing literature has added to the debate surrounding
whether temporarily and permanently restricted assets help not-for-profit institutions better
balance their budgets and fulfill their missions. Though David Yermack (2017 p.217) argues that
restricted donations constrain operating flexibility and focus art museum expenses to activities
with measurable metrics, like program services, Mensah and Werner (2003 p.319-320) and
Yetman and Yetman (2012 p.1062-3) find that a greater amount of restricted assets improves
cost-efficiency and financial reporting for a broad sample of not-for-profit institutions. In that
same vein, although Li et al. (2012 p.112) show that restricted donations encourage donors to
give, restricted donations also limit the freedom of not-for-profit institutions to allocate funds
freely, without donor input. While many private, independent not-for-profit US art museums
(hereafter referred to as ‘museums’) complain about increased restrictions, they may prove
helpful by encouraging donors to be more engaged and by holding museums accountable for
providing society with meaningful experiences, as determined by the donors. Though the
philanthropic community has a long history of supporting arts education, I research whether
restricted gifts affect a museum’s educational programming in the twenty-first century. More
concretely, this paper addresses the question: does restricted giving improve museum education
department performance in terms of their budgets and how many students they serve?
As long as museums and their donors value arts education, restricted donations can help
ensure that museums continue to inspire intercultural dialogue, learning, and creative expression
through their educational programs. Because influential philanthropists, like Agnes Gund, who
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was one of the first arts education advocates to begin donating to museum education initiatives,
have begun focusing their attention on concerns like social justice, the future of arts education
advocacy is uncertain; though there is no concrete evidence that indicates that philanthropists or
museums are substituting away from focusing on arts education and toward social justice causes,
art museum education departments may face increased competition for donation dollars in the
years to come. 1
At a time when nearly all museums mention “education” in their institutional missions, arts
education appears incredibly important in the twenty-first century, at least on the surface. As this
research finds, over the past nine years the quality of museum educational programming has
improved tremendously, with museums dedicating more of their total expenses to education and
narrowing their education audiences given greater proportions of total assets being restricted.
Specifically, for the 129 museums in my sample, a unit increase in permanently restricted assets
as a proportion of total assets corresponds with a 0.1876 percentage point increase in education
expenses as a share of total expenses but a decrease in the number of school districts served by
educational programs, all else equal. Though the introduction of restricted giving has resulted in
the museum becoming a system that is tasked with managing multiple individuals’ interests, as
indicated by this research, arts education takes priority and is in many ways responsible for
defining a museum’s success.2 More precisely, museums benefit from having metrics that
demonstrate the quality of a museum’s educational programming because such metrics have
allowed them to not only solicit philanthropic support, but also demonstrate grant success and
attract visitors.
1

As evidenced by the recent funds established by individuals like Agnes Gund, social justice is
becoming a major focus of the philanthropic community (Pogrebin 2017).
2
The idea behind the museum being a system is founded in research presented by Donella
Meadows in her book Thinking in Systems (Meadows 2008).
4

Just as this research helps museums reflect on how restricted giving has affected their
institutional goals, it also prompts future research with regards to modeling donor behavior and
influence. Because the nature of restricted donations is unobserved and often not disclosed in
public reports, case studies may help to understand what exactly is driving the increase in
museum education department budgets – either donor gifts are being restricted specifically to
educational purposes or restricted gifts are crowding out museum spending in the donors’ areas
of priority and, in response, museums are shifting their general operating funds toward
educational programs. In this way, future research can ascertain whether arts education is a donor
priority, a museum priority, or a priority of both. This will be relevant to many not-for-profit
institutions as they anticipate potential changes in philanthropic interests, which could very well
influence their established goals. Other not-for-profit institutions can use this research and future
research to understand the evolving relationship between themselves and their donors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I describe why museum
education values. In section 3 I demonstrate how the emergence of restricted giving has affected
museums by reviewing prior literature. In section 4 I use theory to understand how the practice
of restricted giving has required museums to commit to prioritizing donor interests like arts
education. After presenting my unique data in section 5, I explain my qualitative analysis
approach in section 6. In section 7 I describe my empirical strategy and discuss my findings in
regards to the prevalence of philanthropic concern for arts education in the twenty-first century.
Section 8 concludes.
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II. Why Does Museum Education Matter?
At their core, museums are community resources. After the US government cut spending
on arts education in the public schools in the 1970s, museums, being responsible for providing
arts education to the public, recognized the need to develop education departments with
specialized educational programs (Bodilly 2008 p.9-10). Since then, museum education has
evolved and there has been no shortage of research to demonstrate its long-term effects on
learning and cross-cultural understanding.3 Acknowledging that the museum must also serve as
an educator, in 1992 the American Association of Museums published a report in which they
declared that “the public dimensions of museums leads them to perform the public service of
education—a term that in its broadest sense includes exploration, study, observation, critical
thinking, contemplation and dialogue” (A Report from the American Association of Museums
1992 p.9), and thereby confirmed that museum educational programs are inherently investments
in society’s advancement. Today, museum educational programs offer “memorable, immersive
learning experiences, provoke imagination, introduce unknown worlds and subject matter, and
offer unique environments for quality time with family” (Gross 2014).
To understand the role of museum education in the twenty-first century, I asked educators
at a sample of museums in the Northeast to share their perspectives on the value of museum
education. In the words of some of the museum educators interviewed:
“Arts education in the broadest of terms brings a sense of creativity and joy, and a sense
of aesthetic understanding. Art making and experiences looking at art can bring people
together in a very human way. They can bring out the best in people and bring people
into the moment.” – Bruce McColl, Director of Art Education, Currier Museum of Art

Case studies at the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art and the Smithsonian Institution’s
Early Enrichment Center are two prominent examples of the research into the long-term impact
of museum education (Kisida 2013; Munley 2012).
3
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“All educational programming in the arts has the potential to allow people to tell their
own stories and find their places in the world” – Rachel Rosen, Director of Education,
American Folk Art Museum
“What I can create for people of all ages is an intimate and safe environment that gives
them the opportunity to feel actively engaged and curious to observe various
perspectives, express themselves, make connections, and listen to others” – Aimee Good,
Director of Education and Community Programs, The Drawing Center
“I like to think of the museum as a sanctuary that is different for every person. Through
museum education each of us can learn something about and even relate to a different
culture.” – Ann Butler Rice, Georgette Auerbach Koopman Director of Education,
Wadsworth Atheneum
“The value of museum education is opportunity. It provides people access to creative
experiences and varied modes of learning. It provides us the ability to learn to speak to
things culturally relevant and to see ourselves and our experiences reflected back in
them.” – Shanta Lawson, Education Director, The Studio Museum in Harlem
“Though the arts have been cut out of schools and the new federal budget suggests the
same, the arts can do what the core subjects cannot. The arts can connect people with
themselves and others in deep ways, which is especially important now.” – Wendy
Woon, The Edward John Noble Foundation Deputy Director for Education, MoMA
Above all else, museum education departments in the twenty-first century are devoted to
their communities. For most of the educators I spoke with, this focus on connection with the
community is at the heart of their work and has been for the past ten years, when many museum
education departments set an intention to reevaluate their specific communities’ needs and
thereafter tailor their programs to meet those needs. Evolving alongside their communities,
museum education departments are committed to being relevant, and of value.
III. A Review of the Financial Constraints on Museums
The Introduction of Restricted Giving
Since their inception, museums have had their roots in the resources, both in terms of art and
money, of wealthy individuals. While museums began to seek diversified funding portfolios in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it became necessary that they balance the interests of
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wealthy patrons with those of government agencies, foundations, and corporations. As I
demonstrate later in my quantitative analysis, at the turn of the twenty-first century, museums
began to lose the unrestricted financial support they had grown accustomed to from their donors,
who had grown skeptical of self-interested museum managers and frustrated with the lack of
growth from their grant-funded programs year after year. As a result of their skepticism and
frustration, art museum donors increasingly began to place restrictions on their donations.
Originally created as a means of preventing staff from indulging in excessive compensation
or benefits at the cost of the collection, restricted gifts have become the industry’s most
important source of permanent capital. Donors recognize restricting their gifts as a way of
attaining greater involvement in the governance of museums and being promised tangible results.
In fact, in 2012, Li et al (p.112) found that since donors have been allowed to place restrictions
on the use of their gifts, not-for-profit organizations have seen an increase in new donations.
By allowing donors the option to place restrictions on their gifts, museums find themselves
balancing three types of assets – those that are unrestricted, those that are temporarily restricted,
and those that are permanently restricted. Museums often favor unrestricted net assets because
they allow for management flexibility in deciding how to spend resources. Not surprisingly,
unrestricted net assets consist of assets that are not subject to restrictions by donors. They include
unrealized gains in endowment funds not subject to restrictions and unrestricted funds generated
during the year that are set aside by the board of trustees into quasi-endowment funds. On the
other hand, net assets that are restricted to specific uses either temporarily or permanently place
constraints on museums. Net assets that are temporarily restricted provisionally restrain a
museum from using them until a donor’s stipulations are met. Those net assets that are
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permanently restricted have a “corpus [that must] be maintained indefinitely by the institution”
(Mensah and Werner 2003 p.295).
Does Restricted Giving Help or Hurt Not-for-Profit Institutions?
Although Yermack (2017 p.217) demonstrates that temporarily and permanently restricted
donations offer stability, affect a higher rate of savings, and encourage additional giving, he also
recognizes that they also consequently constrain operating flexibility. On the one hand, critics of
restricted giving believe not-for-profits lose flexibility when dependent primarily on restricted
donations. Critics cite Yermack (2017 p.217) as evidence of restricted donations indicating a loss
in operating flexibility as Yermack finds that although museums with great amounts of restricted
donor capital exhibit stability in year-to-year operating margins, those margins are so low that
museums must limit their operations to fit their tight budgets. Art museum managers, especially,
remain resistant to restricted donations; the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), an
organization representing the most culturally significant art institutions in the US, actually states
that “gifts and bequests [of all member institutions] should be unrestricted whenever possible”
(Yermack 2017 p.217). On the other hand, proponents of restricted giving believe that not-forprofits do not misuse funds when dependent primarily on restricted donations. Proponents cite
Mensah and Werner (2003 p.319-320) as evidence that cost-efficiency declines with an increase
in unrestricted net assets for not-for-profit universities. Proponents also highlight that when
donors begin to demand better disclosure through the use of restricted donations, financial
reporting improves, according to Yetman and Yetman (2012 p.1059). At the core of their
research, Yetman and Yetman (2012 p.1062-3) find that donors not only discount not-for-profits’
reported program ratios when considering how much to donate, but also require better financial
reporting. Demanding more accurate financial reporting, especially, helps donors prevent the
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misreporting tendencies of not-for-profits. Ultimately, though museums continue to complain
about restrictions, as they infringe upon their freedom to prioritize expenses as they wish, I argue
that restrictions encourage donors to be more informed and engaged with the museums that they
champion.
For most of their already bumpy history, museums clung to the ideal that they were entitled
to choose what types of cultural exposures beyond everyday experiences they wanted to provide
to a wide public. Because donors have begun to gain control over how museums allocate their
budgets and thus prioritize their activities, museums have needed to revise that basic tenet; in the
face of restricted giving that ideal is now subtly changing. As Yermack (2017 p.232) finds, while
museums reported receiving increasingly more restricted donations since 1999, their cost
structures have shifted. Specifically, he finds that museums with greater restricted assets seem to
be required to spend more on programming and less on administration than their counterparts
(Yermack 2017 p.232). While Yermack (2017 p.232) does not find that temporarily restricted
assets have a statistically significant impact on a museum’s cost structure, he does find that
permanently restricted assets have a large, statistically significant impact. Explicitly he finds that
a 1 percentage point increase in total assets that are permanently restricted is associated with a
decrease of 9.1 percentage points in the amount of total expenses directed toward administration
but an increase of 8.5 percentage points in the amount directed toward program services. This
suggests that donors are significantly limiting the misuse of funds by administration and
encouraging museums to focus on expanding program services through their permanently
restricted gifts.
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How Museums Compensate for Scarce Unrestricted Support
Coupled with the entrance of debt following recent economic crises and museum expansions,
the increase in restricted donations industry-wide has left museums with less financial flexibility
and operating discretion. Typically funded by a combination of four sources – donations and
other gifts, revenue from admissions, revenue from related businesses like museum gift shops
and cafes, and endowment earnings – museums find that two of their primary revenue streams,
which include revenues from attendance and charitable donations, are discretionary expenses for
museum patrons. Because revenues from attendance are limited, museums’ art exhibits are in
many ways public goods, and the competitive market price of museum attendance is close to
zero, museums are heavily reliant on discretionary revenues from charitable donations (Temin
1991 p.180). As Coslor (2016 p.4) finds, such discretionary expenses are subject to economic
volatility. While revenues can increase in good economic times, the reverse is true during times
of economic downturn. When there is economic downturn, not only do donations fall
dramatically as wealthy patrons give less, but also there is a negative multiplier effect for the
local economy, in which one dollar less spent at a museum results in less direct and indirect
spending in the local economy. Even the fact that museum attendance, which varies countercyclically with the business cycle as the positive substitution effect outweighs the income effect
on demand, cannot totally offset the decrease in museum revenue, as found by Skinner et al.
(2009 p.503, 507-8).
To counteract the negative multiplier effect prompted by low donation levels, museums have
tried to reduce some expenses and subsidize some operations by expanding for-profit affiliated
operations like cafes and shops. In addition to purchasing less artwork and cutting back on staff,
many museums, especially large ones, have also tried to turn to their endowments when
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donations are low. Though Coslor (2016 p.5) claims that a museum’s financial sustainability
continues in large part thanks to the investment strategy of the endowment, with the decline in
unrestricted assets, general operating expenses cannot always be covered by restricted
endowment earnings, which tend to be meant only for specific activities. To add to that
impediment, all endowment earnings are also vulnerable to stock market fluctuations because
most endowments are invested in a combination of bonds, stocks, and index funds. For instance,
despite having the highest endowment of all US museums, the Los Angeles Getty Museum saw
its portfolio drop by 25% following the economic recession in 2008 (Coslor 2016 p.6).
When expanding for-profit operations, reducing expenses, and pulling from the endowment
is not enough, some museums decide to deaccession art in their collections. Museums that treat
their art as an asset in this way are often presented with challenges such as uncertain returns and
public concerns about whether artwork should be reduced to a financial asset.4 For those reasons,
deaccessioning to cover operating expenses is strongly prohibited in most museum’s and
museum associations’ codes of ethics. In fact, prestigious organizations like the AAMD mandate
that their member museums do not deaccession works of art to cover their operating expenses; to
the AAMD, works of art in a museum’s collection should be counted as fixed, or constant, in
terms of a museum’s assets. The AAMD’s philosophy on deaccessioning has been challenged on
a case-by-case basis. The Berkshire Museum’s warranted sale of art to address the Museum’s
financial crisis is one recent example of a deaccessioning scandal hotly debated and intriguing to
museum professionals (Moynihan 2017; “Summary…” 2018). Generally museums do refrain
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Art is not considered a source of revenue in any museum’s income statement, however it is a
form of investment. In this way, when art is deaccessioned the separation between operations and
investments becomes blurred.
12

from treating art as a financial asset to retain stakeholder trust and thereby attract more
donations, as noted by Coslor (2016 p.1).5
Despite these efforts to expand museums’ funding bases and counter “donation risk,” as notfor-profits, museums remain faced with the reality that the majority of their revenue is and will
always be obtained through charitable donations. Being discretionary in their nature, charitable
donations cannot be raised simply by spending more on fundraising, as Weisbrod (1986 p.95)
and Okten (2000 p.266-7) highlight. Okten (2000) even suggests that, based on his research, the
marginal return to fundraising for individual not-for-profit organizations is exceeded by the
marginal cost across all seven not-for-profit industries – higher education, hospitals, museums,
scientific research organizations, libraries, organizations providing services to the handicapped,
and those providing services to the poor (2000 p.265-6). Because museums do not have control
over when, how, or even whether they receive charitable donations, they have tried to entice
donors to give by seeking as many restricted donations as possible.6 Clearly, for museums to
continue to thrive today and in the future they must focus on how they can best serve their
donors and their donors’ interests, or in other words “the museum is [now] for somebody rather
than about something” (Weil 2002 p.43).
The Impact of Philanthropic Interests
Because the interests of the philanthropic community that supports museums can change over
time, museums are even more financially vulnerable. At different times, museums have benefited
and suffered from the reactive nature of philanthropic giving. For example, according to

For the sake of this investigation, I will assume all museums in my sample (who belong to
AAMD) avoid deaccessioning.
6 In Okten (2000), restricted government grants did not seem to crowd out private donations
(2000 p.265-6).
5
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statistical evidence from the Baltimore Museum of Art, the “arts and culture museums may be in
trouble” now more than ever before, as evidenced by the sharp decline in investment in cultural
institutions and museum attendance nationwide (Rodney 2018). Moreover, during periods of
political tension, the philanthropic community may focus its charitable giving to causes that
promote certain political ideologies; charitable giving to the arts understandably would then fall
to the wayside.7 At other times, though, the philanthropic community may prioritize the arts. For
example, at least some philanthropic concern for the future of arts education continues to exist in
the twenty-first century, as evidenced by the founding of Young Audiences, a non-profit
organization with branches in New York City, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Eastern
Pennsylvania dedicated to providing youth with powerful experiences in the arts (Scutari 2014).
Wishing to have an observable impact on the lives of society’s most disadvantaged, and
recognizing like Temin (1991 p.180) that education in the arts has great externality effects, many
individuals and foundations within the philanthropic community have demonstrated an interest in
funding art museum educational programs. In fact, after individual philanthropists like Agnes
Gund began funneling much money to the arts in response to the 1970s public cuts to arts
education in schools, many museums were able to create entire museum education departments.
Recognized as one of the primary faces of arts education advocacy, Agnes Gund, has inspired
countless individuals, institutions, and corporations to target their charitable gifts toward
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Counter to this engrained tendency, the Director of the Center for the Future of Museums,
Elizabeth Merritt, argues that “’museums help create society’…[they are] space[s] where we as
citizens of a community come together to extend and deepen our knowledge and capacities,” and
as such museums should continue to be supported even in times of demanding political attention
(Rodney 2018).
14

educational opportunities in the arts since founding Studio in a School.8 In the same spirit,
exactly forty years later, the Windgate Foundation established the Windgate Educational
Excellence Through the Arts Endowed Fund at the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art
with the goal of inspiring “quality education, arts access, learning readiness, and workforce skills
with an emphasis on underrepresented and lower socioeconomic youth” (Scutari 2017). Art
museum educational programs are especially well structured for restricted giving from
government agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals because they must be planned,
executed, and evaluated to demonstrate programmatic success. Despite the philanthropic support
that museum education departments have received, museum education departments still exist
conditional on philanthropic support according to museum educators interviewed as part of my
qualitative research in January 2018.
As political tension again arises and new interests in technology and social justice emerge
amongst philanthropists in the twenty-first century, it is imperative that research is conducted to
understand whether the philanthropic community values arts education. Through close analysis
of trends in restricted giving, I investigate whether restricted donations affect museum
educational programming. This analysis is the first of its kind to offer quantitative evidence of
the degree to which arts education continues to be valued by museums and the philanthropic
community.
IV. Theoretical Underpinnings
By restricting their donations to support only certain programs or activities, donors have tried
to prevent museums from spending their donations on activities that the donors did not specify.
Gund’s Studio in a School has brought the arts to life in New York City since 1977 by serving
more than 800,000 New York City school children and demonstrating the power and importance
of arts education (Sheets 2013).
8
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Because museums and donors may prioritize activities differently, without restrictions on
donations, museums may spend the donation revenue in their own interests and donors may
observe a lack of growth in the grant-funded programs year after year and may be skeptical that
funds are being misused by administration. When restrictions are placed on donations, museums
are expected to prioritize the activities indicated by their donors. To cultivate additional
restricted sources of funding, museums must focus on pleasing their donors and presenting
measurable and observable impacts of donor-funded programs and activities on society. In this
way, restricted donations can be understood as mechanisms through which donors (the
principals) can exert greater control over the governance of a museum (the agent) by
incentivizing specific behaviors.
In donating to museums, charitable donors feel rewarded by their donations, especially when
their agents prioritize the activities that they value. All donors gain utility not only from
consuming their own private goods but also from knowing that the museums they champion are
providing the services that they value. When museums offer services to their communities that
donors believe are important, donor utility increases and donors feel compelled to donate more.
By placing a temporary or permanent restriction on their gift and demanding program
evaluations to ensure certain services are provided by the museum they champion, a donor can
guarantee himself or herself utility. Specifically through evaluation, a donor’s marginal cost of
contributing decreases because the restriction on the donation is able to control for agent
divergence, which echoes the key finding in Hölmstrom (1979 p.74) that casual observation of
agent actions by donors can help to address the problem of moral hazard inherent in the
principal-agent relationship. Implicitly, this means that when donors are able to guarantee that
museums prioritize the activities they value, their payoff from donating (𝑝!! ), which is the
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difference between the value added by the museum (y) and the donation they made (𝑑! ),
increases.
𝑝!! = y – 𝑑!

(1)

For museums, the restricted donation contract requires them to exert greater efforts to
continue receiving philanthropic support. With donors hesitant to donate unrestricted funds,
museums have found themselves forced to generate more restricted donations. To remain
competitive institutions, museums have had to undertake any and all measures to at least
maintain the total amount of donations they receive (
donations (

!!
!!!(𝑑!! ))

!! !!!
!!! (𝑑! ));

has fallen, museums have had to focus their efforts to attract more

temporarily and permanently restricted donations (

!!
!!!(𝑑!!

+ 𝑑!! )). Without unrestricted

donations, the total amount of donations that museums receive (
restricted giving (

as the amount of unrestricted

!!
!!!(𝑑!!

!! !!!
!!! (𝑑! ))

mirrors trends in

+ 𝑑!! )). In this way, to retain restricted support, museums have had to

adjust their activities and cost structures to match the interests of their donors.
!! !!!
!!! (𝑑! )

=

!!
!!!(𝑑!! )

+

!!
!!!(𝑑!!

+ 𝑑!! )

(2)

In trying to attract more restricted donations, museums have tried to engineer ways of
balancing their own desires with those of their donors. After soliciting contributions from
(𝑛! + 𝑛! ) donors, who, for simplicity, have homogeneous preferences and gain utility from
museums providing their public services to society, museums are expected to spend all of their
received contributions on providing the public services that their donors value.9 For each
donation (𝑑! ), a museum must spend a given amount on providing the public services that each
9

I assume museum managers do not steal or misuse their received funds.
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donor values. The given amount that a museum must spend is determined by a cost function
(𝑐! (𝑎)), which accounts for the opportunity costs that the museum incurs when acting in ways
favorable to their donors. Because the modern museum is dependent on restricted donations, it
does not have the luxury to spend restricted donations freely to cover the costs of activities other
than those outlined in the restriction contract, even if those other activities are more important to
museum staff. In this way, the payoff to a museum from an individual donation (𝑝!! ), which is
equal to the difference between the donation received (𝑑! ) and the cost of the behavior and
subsequent actions taken (𝑐! (𝑎)), is often less than the actual donation amount and could even be
negative. When trying to maximize their ability to spend their resources on activities that they
value (which may differ from the activities that their donors value in some cases), museums want
to maintain some payoff (𝑝!! ), which means they must ensure that 𝑐! (𝑎) < 𝑑! .
𝑝!! = 𝑑! – 𝑐! (𝑎)

(3)

In the presence of restricted donations, the difference between aggregate contributions and
the amount a museum spends on providing the public services that their donors value shrinks. As
a result, donors, knowing that for a given donation amount, 𝑑! , the likelihood of their interests
being adopted by the museums they champion increases, are more encouraged to donate.
Museums benefit from greater aggregate contributions but must accept that they must prioritize
their donors’ interests to a greater degree in the presence of restricted donations. Less able to
spend their resources freely without donor input, museums incur reduced payoffs in the presence
of restricted donations, but the provision of public services valuable to the philanthropic
community reaches a more welfare-maximizing level, at least according to the philanthropic
community.
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Ultimately the recent innovation by donors to place restrictions on how their gifts can be
used by museums has had a significant effect on both donor and museum behavior. Donors have
benefitted from being assured that museums prioritize the activities that they value while
museums have needed to commit to putting their donors’ interests first. Should donors value arts
education in the twenty-first century, I expect that restricted donations will increase museum
education department budgets. As long as museums also value arts education, both the donors
and the museums that they champion should maintain positive payoffs from restricted donations.
Using a robust panel data, I analyze whether restricted donations improve museum education
department performance indicators. In the sections that follow I test whether restricted giving
increases museum education department budgets and whether museum education departments
serve more students as a result.
V. Data
To analyze the affect of restricted donations on museum education department performance
indicators, I collect data from two sources: annual survey responses collected by the Association
of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) and financial information from museums’ annual Form 990s
filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Of the 242 member institutions of the AAMD,
which represent the most culturally significant art museums in the US, only 129 also file
complete Form 990s with the IRS as private, independent not-for-profit US art museums. Those
129 museums comprise my sample.10

10

Because my sample looks at just private, independent not-for-profit US art museums part of
the AAMD there is selection bias. Only museums that have an educational mission with
regularly scheduled programs and exhibitions, and a professional staff and board are eligible for
AAMD membership.
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The inclusion of museum characteristics detailed in AAMD survey responses allows me to
investigate trends in internal museum activities and makes my research the first empirical study
to use AAMD data. I gather responses to the AAMD survey from the years in which the survey
was successfully administered and results were organized: 2003-2006, 2008, and 2013-2016. The
AAMD survey questions that I am concerned with include details regarding a museum’s board,
staff, acquisitions, exhibitions, public and educational programs, and expenses, among other
specific topics. Because data fields changed slightly in different years, specific fields lack
observations. Table 1 (column 1) presents key summary statistics of the type of museums that
responded to the AAMD’s annual surveys. The data indicate that the average US art museum has
seen 292,146 visitors each year since 2003. On average, US art museums purchase roughly 169
pieces of art each year, or $2.3 million in art assets. The museums that responded to the
AAMD’s annual surveys offered a wide variety of 561 public programs annually since 2003, on
average. Since 2003, AAMD member institutions on average have served 332 schools, including
570 school groups and 112 school districts each year.
Subtle differences seem to arise between museums in my sample and other AAMD
member institutions. Roughly 26% of all AAMD respondents declared some sort of affiliation
with a college or university and 15% mentioned having an art school component to their
institution. While the majority of all respondents did not belong to a larger, parent organization,
18% belonged to a college or university, 11% belonged to the government, and 6% belonged to
some other non-museum not-for-profit organization. Of the 129 museums in my sample (Table 2
column 2), only 1% belonged to a government entity and 3% to another non-museum not-forprofit organization. The museums in my sample disclosed no affiliations with colleges or
universities on average (Table 1, column 2) and only 7.66% indicated having some sort of art
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school component to their institution since 2003. The AAMD member institutions excluded from
my sample did not similarly file tax documents independently with the IRS. Over 51% of those
institutions divulged an affiliation with a college or university (Table 1, column 3) and over 22%
affirmed having an art school component. Furthermore, those member institutions not included
in my sample were much more likely to belong to a college or university, a government entity, or
another non-museum not-for-profit organization (Table 2, column 3), which would explain why
they have not filed tax documents independently with the IRS.
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Table 1

Total Operating Budget (in millions of USD)
Total Operating Expenses (in millions of USD)
Total Endowment Income (in millions of USD)
Staff Expenses (in millions of USD)
Art Acquisitions by Donation (in millions of USD)
Art Acquisitions Purchased (in millions of USD)
Art Acquisitions by Bequest (#)
Art Acquisitions Purchased (#)
Public Programs
School Groups Served
School Districts Served
Total K-12 Schools Served
Total K-12 Students Served
Total Education Space (square feet)
Total Reported Attendance
College/University Affiliated
Art School Component

1
All AAMD
Members
Mean
N
15.4 650
15.0 1530
3.60 1335
7.26 1515
5.12 1077
2.33 1304
371 1339
169 1314
561 810
570 830
112 756
332 404
16589 955
14946 471
292146 1524
0.2599 654
0.1485 855

2
My Sample
Mean
19.9
20.0
4.71
9.79
4.45
2.66
301
147
638
642
188
486
21245
18230
366385
0.0031
0.0766

N
325
732
680
730
517
642
652
639
412
418
382
203
482
221
734
325
431

3
Those Excluded
from My Sample
Mean
N
10.9 325
10.5 798
2.44 655
4.92 785
5.74 560
2.00 662
437 687
190 675
480 398
498 412
35 374
176 201
11845 473
12043 250
223169 790
0.5137 329
0.2217 424

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of a sample of US art museums between 2003 and 2016.
Column 1 summarizes observations for all AAMD member museums. Column 2 summarizes
observations for 129 of the AAMD member museums that are private and independently run and
that comprise my sample. Column 3 summarizes observations for the AAMD member museums
not private or independently run. Key museum characteristics related to museum educational
programming, acquisitions of art, and basic financial indicators are highlighted. This data was
obtained, as available, from the AAMD’s annual survey reports since 2003.
Table 2

None
College/University
Government Entity
Other non-museum nonprofit organization
Other

1

2

3

All AAMD
Members

My Sample

Those Excluded
from My Sample

0.62
0.18
0.11
0.06
0.04

0.91
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.04

0.32
0.36
0.20
0.08
0.04

Table 2 presents a breakdown of the type of parent organizations of AAMD member museums
between 2003 and 2016. The values are presented as decimals. Column 1 summarizes
observations for all AAMD member museums. Column 2 summarizes observations for the 129
of the AAMD member museums that are private and independently run and that comprise my
sample. Column 3 summarizes observations for the AAMD member museums not part of my
sample. This data was obtained, as available, from the AAMD’s annual survey reports since
2003.
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The behavior of the museums belonging to my sample appears to deviate from the
behavior of those that are more likely to report to larger, parent organizations. As evidenced in
Table 3 (column 1), all AAMD respondents have dedicated 25.48% of their total operating
expenses to administration, 14.97% to curatorial projects, 12.58% to collections care and
management, 9.86% to development work, 7.25% to education, 5.83% to benefit events, 4.88%
to membership, and 2.98% to other on average since 2003. For those museums that also file tax
documents independently with the IRS, reporting higher dedication amounts to all museum
departments is common (Table 3, column 2). In fact, despite their higher mean total operating
budgets and total operating expenses (Table 1, Column 2), the sum of the average dedication
proportions to administration, curatorial, collections care and management, development,
education, benefit events, and membership departments suggests that my sample of museums
may double-count reported expenses on an annual basis. Conversely, the member institutions not
included in my sample report lower dedication proportions than those included in the sub-sample
in nearly every museum department (Table 3, column 3).
Table 3

Administration
Curatorial
Collections Care and Management
Development
Education
Benefit Events
Membership
Other

1
All AAMD
Members
Mean
N
0.2548 1509
0.1497 1468
0.1258 1432
0.0986 1431
0.0725 1499
0.0583 1041
0.0488 1282
0.0298 853

2
My Sample
Mean
0.3301
0.1919
0.1789
0.1420
0.0719
0.0799
0.0742
-0.2848

N
731
713
694
722
727
596
652
502

3
Those Excluded
from My Sample
Mean
N
0.1841 778
0.1099 755
0.0759 738
0.0544 709
0.0730 772
0.0294 445
0.0225 630
0.4798 351

Table 3 shows the mean proportion of departmental expenses relative to total expenses for
AAMD member museums between 2003 and 2016. Column 1 summarizes observations for all
AAMD member museums. Column 2 summarizes observations for 129 of the AAMD member
museums that are private and independently run. Column 3 summarizes observations for the
AAMD member museums not private or independently run. This data was obtained, as available,
from the AAMD’s annual survey reports since 2003.
23

I hypothesize that the museums included in my sample tend to have higher operating
budgets, expenses, and revenues than their peer institutions within the AAMD because my
sample includes nearly every well-known independent museum in the US such as the Art
Institute of Chicago, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in
New York, as they tend to file their tax documents independently with the IRS. In other words,
my sample generally characterizes the superstar museums of the US. Despite being comprised of
superstars that are unaffiliated with higher education institutions, the museums included in my
sample appear to value educational programming slightly more than their peers within the
AAMD (Table 1, Column 2).
As evidenced by Figures 1-4, museum education department performance for the
museums in my sample has not changed linearly over time, which suggests that other factors
besides time influence museum education department performance. All of this will be important
to keep in mind in when analyzing how donor restrictions influence museum education
department performance indicators, which include the proportion of total expenses dedicated to
education, the number of students served by educational programs, the number of school districts
served by educational programs, and the amount of museum space reserved for education.
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Figures 1-4
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Figures 1-4 show the change in average museum education department performance over time
for 129 museums. Museum education department performance indicators include: the proportion
of total expenses dedicated to education, the number of students served by educational programs,
the number of school districts served by educational programs, and the amount of museum space
reserved for education. All data have been obtained from the museums' AAMD survey
responses. Missing values indicate years not surveyed.
To understand how restricted donations affect museum activities and museum education
department performance, I collect financial data from the Form 990s for the 129 museums in my
sample from the Guidestar.org database. I gather annual financial observations since 1999, as
possible, and ultimately collect 2,244 museum-year observations for the sample overall. The
missing values in this dataset are the result of museums failing to complete all required fields in
the Form 990. Table 4 presents summary statistics for basic financial information for the
museums in my sample. Museums in my sample appear to balance their budgets on average; the
mean value of total revenue, 27.1 million dollars, exceeds the mean value of total expenses, 20.7
million dollars. The data also indicate that museums are largely financed by contributions and
grants. In fact, on average the museums in my sample receive nearly 62% of their annual revenue
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from donations while they receive only 12% from fees paid by museum visitors and participants
in program services.11 This dependence on contributions and grants is not a shared characteristic
across the entire not-for-profit sector, however; in 2012, for instance, only 21% of not-for-profit
revenue resulted from donations while 72% came from program services (“Quick Facts About
Not-for-profits”). Beyond depending on contributions and grants, the 129 museums in my
sample rely heavily on restricted donations: 26% of their total assets are permanently restricted
and 21% are temporarily restricted, on average. The fact that admissions and fees collected from
program services provided minimal income for the museums in my sample echoes the sentiment
expressed by the AAMD Director, Christine Anagnos, in a 2015 interview when she stated “art
museums are very much committed to providing services that go well beyond the actual price of
admission, so it’s important for museums to have … diverse sources of revenue” (Boehm 2015).
The diverse sources of revenue that she references include private donations and government
support.

This would be even greater if the fair market value of donations of artwork was included
instead of the acquisition cost, but because such information is not reported in museum Form 990
filings, this relationship is left understated.
11

26

Table 4
Mean
Total Assets
Total Liabilities
Program Services Revenue
Total Revenue
Fundraising Expenses
General Operating Expenses
Program Services Expenses
Total Expenses
Leverage
Program Services Revenue/Total Revenue
Donation Revenue/Total Revenue
Temporarily Restricted Assets/Total Assets
Permanently Restricted Assets/Total Assets
Fixed Assets/Total Assets

161
25.2
3.9
27.1
1.1
2.8
13.1
20.7
0.1193
0.1166
0.6159
0.2088
0.2609
0.3039

Std.
Min Max
N
Dev.
357
0 4000 2174
73.9
0
719 2174
13.7
0
214 2174
58.9
0
763 2174
1.8
0
14.7 2174
5.8
0
58.5 2174
34.3
0
437 2174
43.9
0
500 2174
0.1553
0
0.99 2158
0.1203
0 0.889 2167
0.2302
0
1 1926
0.1936
0 0.9860 2162
0.2177
0 0.9350 2166
0.2226
0 0.9960 2166

Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of important financial indicators for a sample of 129
private, independent not-for-profit US art museums between 1999 and 2016. Leverage equals
total liabilities over total assets. All dollar values are recorded in millions of US dollars and all
balance sheet data was recorded at the start of each year.
During the 1999-2016 period, though total museum revenue rose modestly at a rate of 2.5%
per year, the growth rates of nearly every major revenue stream for the museums in my sample
exhibited unpredictable fluctuations annually. To compensate for the uncertain growth rates of
their revenue sources, revealed by the high standard deviations of 49.91, 81.55, and 64.98 in
Table 5, many museums have tried to secure more restricted assets from donors through
temporarily and permanently restricted donations. Also presented in Table 5, because no two
museum revenue sources appear highly correlated (each correlation factor is positive but less
than 0.5), there is only a slight risk that the poor performance of one revenue stream might be
correlated with the poor performance of another revenue stream. As presented in Table 6,
however, museum spending channels do appear highly correlated. Total expenses are most
highly correlated with spending on program services, having a correlation factor of 0.9009. The
high correlation factors between all spending channels suggests that when a museum spends
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more on its fundraising efforts, for example, it also spends more on all other dimensions and
departments.
Table 5
Correlation with
Mean Growth
Rate (%)

Obs.
Revenue from program services
Revenue from educational programs
Cash Donations and Grants
Total Revenue

1959
261
1962
2019

4.1616
-2.0120
4.0469
2.4962

SD (%)
49.9141
81.5474
64.9794
59.9026

Revenue from Revenue from
program
educational
services
programs
0.4963
0.3180

0.4999

Table 5 presents annual growth rates (compounded continuously to address concerns of outliers)
and correlations among different museum revenue sources for 129 museums. Revenue from
program services includes admission charges, memberships, and related costs while revenues
from other museum activities come from parking, restaurants, and gift shop purchases. Data have
been collected from the museums' IRS Form 990 filings recorded at the beginning of the year
and museum responses to annual AAMD surveys.
Table 6
Fundraising
Expenses
Fundraising
Expenses
General
Operating
Expenses
Program
Services
Expenses
Total
Expenses

Correlation with
General
Program
Operating
Services
Expenses
Expenses

Total
Expenses

1.0000
0.8891

1.0000

0.8400

0.8824

1.0000

0.7654

0.8180

0.9009

1.0000

Table 6 presents correlation factors between different museum spending channels for 129
museums. Data have been collected from museum responses to annual AAMD surveys.
VI. Qualitative Approach and Evidence
To complement my quantitative study, over the course of three weeks in January 2018, I
spoke with ten museum staff members working at nine of the museums in my sample. All ten
museum staff members worked for museums in the Northeast. Each had volunteered their time to
share their perspective of the evolution of museum education as it relates to the practice of
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restricted giving with me. Because I was limited in travel capability and amount of responses
from museum staff members who received my original inquiry email, my January sample of
museum staff members is not necessarily representative of all museum staff members included in
my sample. Regardless, many of the museum staff members that I interviewed also shared their
experiences at other museums across the country with me. I led each informational interview a
series of questions detailed in the appendix.
Not only did every museum staff member that I interviewed believe that museum
education has become a more central part of the basic museum tenet over the past ten years, but
they also recognize that restricted giving has affected the programmatic capacities of their
museum education departments in many ways, such as through the development of better
evaluation tools and the targeting of programs to meet certain community needs. In the twentyfirst century, museums are not just learning places, but also learning organizations themselves in
that they continue to learn from the public, the local community, and other agencies as they seek
to provide even more enriching educational experiences with the arts. In the following section I
highlight some of the most powerful sentiments shared by museum staff about how restricted
giving has affected museum education departments’ performance.

VII. Research Methods and Empirical Evidence
To test my hypothesis that museum education department performance improves as a result
of more total assets being restricted up to a threshold above which baseline administration can be
covered, I construct a fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors, using data
reported by 129 museums over nine years. I associate changes in (1) museum activities and (2)
museum education department performance indicators, with changes in the proportion of total
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assets that are restricted. With this specification, my identifying assumption is that, conditional
on the included controls, changes in museum spending priorities are driven only by changes in
restricted assets. Because I notice a dramatic decline in unrestricted donations since 1999 for the
museums that comprise my sample, as demonstrated by Figure 5, I include fiscal year fixed
effects in my specification to rule out any sort of time trend explanation for changes in museum
activities and museum education department performance indicators.12 I also include museum
fixed effects in my specification to capture inter-museum differences because museums vary
immensely in terms of their missions, finances, boards, and relations with their communities and
much of that information is not evident in quantitative reporting. By using museum and fiscal
year fixed effects I reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias; to rule out omitted variable
bias I compute coefficients both with and without fixed effects and find the coefficients to be
stable. I assume there are no unobserved factors that vary across museums such that they might
be correlated with changes in my explanatory variables.
There is one major potential concern with my approach in that I cannot observe the nature of
the restricted donations. In other words, when donors restrict their charitable gifts to certain
museum activities, museums may shift their general operating funds toward other activities they
value if restricted gifts crowd out museum spending on the donors’ priorities. As a result I cannot
determine from my model whether the effect on museum cost structures of a greater proportion
of total assets that are restricted reflects donor priorities, museum priorities, or a mix of both.
Figure 5 demonstrates the evolution of how total capital reported on museum balance sheets
has been broken down over the 1999-2016 period. The decrease in unrestricted donations
confirms the evidence presented in prior literature like Yermack (2017 p.217). This quantitative
evidence (coupled with the recent viral twitter conversation speculating that the Met is finally
charging an admission fee to make up for the institution’s lack of financial flexibility in having
over 45% of its endowment restricted to “donor-defined uses” (Bacharach 2018)) suggests that
restricted donations are the most important source of permanent capital in the art museum
industry now more than ever.
12
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Figure 5
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Figure 5 elucidates how the aggregate amount of capital invested by the 129 museums in my
sample has changed since 1999. Together, the four categories sum to the museums’ total assets.
All data have been obtained from the museums' IRS Form 990 filings.
Using my panel data set, I estimate the effect of changes in asset composition on changes
three outcomes (𝑦!" ). My basic model is specified as follows with 𝑦!" representing the proportion
of total expenses dedicated to administration (𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" ), the proportion of total expenses
dedicated to program services (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" ), and the proportion of total expenses dedicated to
fundraising (𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!! ).
𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑣!" + 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝜇!"

(4)
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As evidenced in equation 4, I use the same core explanatory variables as Yermack (2017),
which include: the proportion of total assets temporarily restricted (𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝!" ), the proportion of
total assets permanently restricted (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝!" ), various museum characteristics (comprising: the
log of program service revenue as a measure of museum size, the proportion of total assets that
are fixed, and leverage) (𝑣!" ), museum fixed effects (𝛼! ), and fiscal year fixed effects (𝛿! ). I also
add additional explanatory variables to reflect key museum characteristics, including: the total
number of board officers and whether or not a museum is dedicated solely to contemporary art,
both of which are represented within the vector of museum characteristics (𝑣!" ) in equation 4. I
confirm there is no evidence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and I correct
for heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors, clustered at the employer
identification number (EIN) level.13
Using Yermack (2017) as my baseline, I expect that a unit increase in permanently restricted
assets as a proportion of total assets (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝!" ) will correspond with an increase in program
services expenses as a share of total expenses, all else equal. I anticipate program services will
receive proportionately more donor support because their programmatic success can be
measured. Administration and fundraising do not lend themselves as well to measurable metrics.
Table 7 shows that my findings echo Yermack’s key finding (2017 p.215) that not-for-profit
US art museums with greater restrictions tend to adjust their cost structures to bolster their
program services. Most clearly, when I replicate Yermack (2017) with additional observations
from more recent years, using 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" as my dependent variable (columns (e) and (f)), my
coefficient estimates on the proportion of total assets that are restricted permanently share the
same signs as those of Yermack (2017) and are statistically significant. This finding confirms my
13

Employer Identification Numbers are issued for the purpose of tax administration. I use the
EINs to identify the different museums that comprise my sample.
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hypothesis that a unit increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets
corresponds with an increase in program services expenses, all else equal. Specifically, I find
that a percentage point increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets is
associated with a 0.2524 percentage point increase in program services expenses, which is
notably higher that the baseline 0.085 percentage point increase found by Yermack (2017). Also
evidence of my sample being slightly different than Yermack (2017), when I replicate Yermack
(2017) with additional observations from more recent years, using 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" as my
dependent variable (columns (a) and (b)), my coefficient estimates on the proportion of total
assets that are restricted permanently share the same signs as those of Yermack (2017) but they
are not statistically significant for my sample period of 1999-2016. When I use 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" as
my dependent variable (columns (i) and (j)), my coefficient estimates on the proportion of total
assets that are restricted permanently do not share the same signs as those of Yermack (2017)
and are not statistically significant for my sample period of 1999-2016. Even after I limit my
observations to those collected between 1999-2013, my results are not identical to Yermack
(2017); a difference in data cleaning procedures is likely responsible for the discrepancies.
When I include additional explanatory variables to control for museum characteristics, using
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" (column (d)) and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" (column (h)) as my dependent variables, my
sample shrinks to observations between 2014-2016, when the AAMD survey asked questions
specifically relating to the board size and art focus of a museum. My hypothesis that a unit
increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets corresponds with a
decrease in administrative expenses as a share of total expenses and an increase in program
services expenses as a share of total expenses is disproven when my sample period is 2014-2016.
When 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" (column (d)) is my dependent variable, a percentage point increase in
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permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets corresponds with a statistically
significant 0.242 percentage point increase in administrative expenses as a share of total
expenses, ceteris paribus. When 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" (column (h)) is my dependent variable, a
percentage point increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets is
associated with a statistically significant 0.3581 percentage point decrease in program services
expenses as a share of total expenses. When 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝!" (columns (k) and (l)) is my dependent
variable, a percentage point increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total
assets corresponds with an increase in fundraising expenses as a share of total expenses, which is
statistically significant at the 10% level with fixed effects (column (l)). I attribute the differences
between my coefficient estimates and those of Yermack (2017) when I add the additional
explanatory variables to the difference in sample periods. Assuming major financial decisions
regarding museums’ cost structures may be informed by board members’ opinions and museums
dedicated to contemporary art are a unique subset of museums, when I analyze how changes in
asset composition affect changes in museum spending priorities between 2014-2016, I find that
program services were not necessarily a museum or donor priority at that time, which
demonstrates that spending priorities do in fact change over time.
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Table 7
Administration/Total Expenses

Temporarily Restricted
Assets/Total Assets
Permanently Restricted
Assets/Total Assets
Museum Size (log of
program service revenue)
Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Leverage

Yermack
(2017)
-0.026
(0.017)
-0.091***
(0.021)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.015
(0.018)
-0.003
(0.020)

-0.0023
(0.0273)
-0.0199
(0.0250)
-0.0116***
(0.0030)
0.0641***
(0.0204)
-0.0802***
(0.0271)

0.0125
(0.0344)
-0.0223
(0.0361)
-0.0161**
(0.0073)
0.0944***
(0.0277)
-0.0845**
(0.0347)

Yes
0.51
1705

No
0.1051
2089

Yes
0.0951
2089

a

b

Total Officers
Contemporary
Fixed Effects
R-squared
Number of Observations

c
-0.0739*
(0.0412)
0.1214
(0.0871)
-0.0075*
(0.0041)
0.0315
(0.0382)
0.0322
(0.0411)
-0.0001
(0.0004)
-0.0025
(0.0113)
No
0.0242
261

Program Services/Total Expenses
d
-0.0533
(0.0676)
0.2420**
(0.1079)
-0.0041
(0.0069)
0.0492
(0.0493)
0.0998
(0.0867)
0.0010
(0.0009)
0.0030
(0.0161)
Yes
0.0006
261

Yermack
(2017)
0.009
(0.018)
0.085***
(0.022)
0.018***
(0.004)
0.047**
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.021)

0.0169
(0.0510)
0.1055***
(0.0393)
0.0220***
(0.0033)
0.1764***
(0.0391)
-0.0471
(0.0477)

0.1330
(0.0872)
0.2524**
(0.0967)
0.0051
(0.0153)
0.4569***
(0.0608)
-0.1472
(0.0894)

Yes
0.56
1705

No
0.0810
2089

Yes
0.0000
2089

e

f

g
0.0298
(0.0662)
-0.1267
(0.0966)
0.0165***
(0.0045)
-0.0638
(0.0482)
-0.0399
(0.0498)
0.0002
(0.0004)
0.0024
(0.0123)
No
0.1077
261

Fundraising/Total Expenses
h
-0.0680
(0.1297)
-0.3580**
(0.1404)
0.0074
(0.0080)
-0.0762
(0.0699)
-0.1052
(0.1174)
-0.0012
(0.0011)
0.0070
(0.0171)
Yes
0.0000
261

Yermack
(2017)
0.005***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.0007*
(0.0004)
0.005***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)

0.0374**
(0.0156)
0.0210
(0.0129)
-0.0065***
(0.0022)
0.0479***
(0.0139)
-0.0174
(0.0130)

0.0339*
(0.0190)
0.0291
(0.0176)
-0.0049
(0.0043)
0.0520***
(0.0162)
-0.0278*
(0.0161)

Yes
0.2
1705

No
0.1469
2089

Yes
0.1052
2089

i

j

k
0.0474
(0.0534)
0.0256
(0.0243)
-0.0086***
(0.0026)
0.0373*
(0.0218)
0.0136
(0.0238)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0006
(0.0068)
No
0.1367
261

l
0.1212
0.1099
0.1160*
(0.0698)
-0.0033
(0.0034)
0.0270
(0.0342)
0.0055
(0.0624)
0.0001
(0.0005)
-0.0100
(0.0071)
Yes
0.0017
261

Table 7 presents fixed effects regression estimates of the influence of asset size and composition on art museums’ cost structures. Data has been
obtained from 129 museums' IRS Form 990 filings between 1999 and 2016. Standard errors are in parentheses and significance is denoted:
significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

Again using my panel data set, I estimate the effect of changes in asset composition on
changes three outcomes (𝑦!" ). My basic model is specified as follows, with 𝑦!" representing the
proportion of total expenses dedicated to education departments (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑝!" ), the number of
students served by museum educational programs (𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠!" ), the number of school districts
served by museum educational programs (𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠!" ), and how much museum space is
dedicated to educational purposes (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒!" ).
𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑣!" + 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝜇!"

(5)

As evidenced in equation 5, I again use the same core explanatory variables as Yermack
(2017), which include: the proportion of total assets temporarily restricted (𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝!" ), the
proportion of total assets permanently restricted (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝!" ), various museum characteristics
(comprising: the log of program service revenue as a measure of museum size, the proportion of
total assets that are fixed, and leverage) (𝑣!" ), museum fixed effects (𝛼! ), and fiscal year fixed
effects (𝛿! ). I add an additional explanatory variable to reflect how much revenue is collected
from educational programming offerings because I believe the amount of revenue museums
receive from educational programs informs, to some degree, how much they focus on improving
and expanding the reach of such programs. This additional explanatory variable is included
within the vector of museum characteristics (𝑣!" ) in equation 5. I again confirm there is no
evidence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and I use robust standard errors,
clustered at the employer identification number (EIN) level.
Based on the perception of the museum staff whom I interviewed that museum education has
benefitted from restricted giving over the past ten years, I expect that a unit increase in
permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets will correspond with an increase in
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education expenses as a share of total expenses, all else equal. Similarly I expect that greater
restricted assets as a proportion of total assets will prompt museums to be more interested in
demonstrating programmatic success to retain and attract donors.14 To demonstrate such success
I expect museum education departments will provide better quality educational programs, though
I am unsure whether that means reaching more or fewer students.
Table 8 shows my results. I find that between 1999 and 2016, museums dedicate a larger
proportion of their total expenses to educational purposes given greater proportions of total
assets being restricted temporarily and permanently on average in columns (c) and (d), where I
include the additional explanatory variable. I find that a percentage point increase in temporarily
restricted assets as a proportion of total assets corresponds with a statistically significant 0.1584
percentage point increase in education expenses as a share of total expenses, all else equal. A
percentage point increase in permanently restricted assets as a proportion of total assets is
associated with a statistically significant 0.1876 percentage point increase in education expenses
as a share of total expenses. Despite their spending relatively more on education in environments
dominated by restricted donations, given a percentage point increase in temporarily restricted
assets as a proportion of total assets, museums on average serve 86 school districts fewer through
their educational programs, as demonstrated by column (l). Perhaps as a consequence of
museums reaching fewer school districts, those museums on average serve fewer students,
though not confirmed by statistical significance, as demonstrated by models (e), (f), (g), and (h).
When museums face greater proportions of total assets being restricted temporarily and
permanently, they also seem to have less museum space dedicated to education, though this is
not confirmed by statistical significance, as demonstrated by column (p).
Demonstrating programmatic success is so important because it has an outsize influence: using
arts education metrics in grant applications helps to increase the museum budget.
14
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Table 8
Temporarily Restricted
Assets/Total Assets
Permanently Restricted
Assets/Total Assets
Museum Size (log of
program service revenue)
Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Leverage
Revenue from Education
Programs
Fixed Effects
R-squared
Number of Observations

Education Expenses/Total Expenses
a
b
c
d
0.0076
-0.0159
0.0950**
0.1584***
(0.0175)
(0.0321)
(0.0386)
(0.0409)
0.0029
0.0157
0.0934**
0.1876***
(0.0183)
(0.0277)
(0.0429)
(0.0558)
-0.0045**
0.0052
-0.0038
-0.0064
(0.0020)
(0.0071)
(0.0052)
(0.0065)
-0.0017
-0.0446
0.0388
0.1293**
(0.0220)
(0.0548)
(0.0374)
(0.0533)
0.0122
0.0515
0.0152
0.0845
(0.0218)
(0.0421)
(0.0609)
(0.1037)
-0.0000*
-0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.0357
0.0297
0.0049
0.0004
643
643
145
145

Number of Students Served
Number of School Districts Served
Museum-Based Education Space (sq. ft.)
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
m
n
o
p
12014.6431
2883.0669
-3781.7798
106.5645
1003.1626
-84.3156**
-85.6209**
2394.5797
2053.0263
1721.8583 -25535.0462
(17421.9240)
(7084.3836)
(6921.0828)
(259.0965) (1253.3029)
(38.9481)
(39.1946) (2321.0832) (2362.8142) (5559.7909) (17419.5174)
-5988.1724 -14572.5909
-7620.7662
934.2896
1121.8738
-97.8572
-99.9378
1741.4555
31.5902
-571.2299 -17359.6624
(15522.1166)
(9180.5463)
(9204.8079)
(900.6955) (1267.4878)
(68.1301)
(68.3020) (2655.9319) (4542.9999) (4427.7645) (16958.0975)
-4173.8000 3447.3967***
701.0181
265.8451
-216.4626
-10.1496*
-10.3788* 2012.6867***
665.9291 2534.9725***
-644.0815
(3683.4080)
(1311.5176)
(1199.7553) (239.7366) (225.1960)
(5.5958)
(5.6093)
(650.4264) (830.2381)
(917.4028) (1380.8977)
18381.9147* -25110.3880** -14602.7256*
697.5391
-67.1738 -142.2644*** -143.6382***
1910.0569 6303.5240**
-2456.2876 -37635.0064
(9668.6630) (10094.9309)
(8123.8626)
(671.3661) (280.4474)
(52.9193)
(53.1460) (1895.9050) (2447.9473) (6780.5261) (27491.5231)
-25310.5112
-3510.6729 -23093.9795**
939.4602 -1919.8148
15.7578
13.9692
-2603.2971 -3434.1445
3788.5817
1104.6819
(32334.9737) (11280.0905) (11328.4308) (1002.8682) (2074.7811)
(73.6837)
(73.4695) (2270.7032) (3237.8710) (7887.3406) (15989.9928)
0.0021***
0.0013***
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0020 -0.0043***
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0020)
(0.0012)
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
0.2522
0.1851
0.2522
0.0619
0.0699
0.0364
0.0296
0.0307
0.1762
0.0342
0.0601
0.0530
413
413
143
143
320
320
127
127
640
640
144
144

e
15845.3424
(10676.7661)
-7297.4692
(10539.7977)
5918.6181***
(1279.3758)
597.0781
(6012.8298)
-14164.3196
(17932.4450)

Table 8 presents fixed effects regression estimates of the influence of asset size and composition on the performance of museum education
departments. Data has been obtained from 129 not-for-profit US art museums' IRS Form 990 filings between 1999 and 2016. Standard errors are in
parentheses and significance is denoted: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

To understand why museums on average dedicate more of their total expenses to educational
purposes but serve less school districts (and thereby students) when faced with greater
proportions of total assets being restricted, I reference thoughts shared by museum educators
over informational interviews conducted in January, 2018. It is my understanding that, to retain
the restricted donations they have grown dependent on, museum education departments have
developed impressive evaluation practices to measure the impact of their services and
subsequently share that impact with their donors. Shanta Lawson, the Education Director of the
Studio Museum in Harlem, recognizes this shift toward greater evaluation as a response to
“foundations want[ing] to see the numbers, the impact of their support.” To Lawson this “burden
of proof” has become even more substantial over the past ten years. Though private
philanthropists may not demand as much evidence of programmatic success as grant-making
foundations or government agencies, consulting firms like The Philanthropic Initiative continue
to encourage all donors, whether they are foundations, corporations, or individuals, to monitor
museum conformance to donor-outlined objectives (“Making a Difference” 2015). For Anne
Butler Rice, the Georgette Auerbach Koopman Director of Education at the Wadsworth
Atheneum Museum, this focus on evaluation has been a reflection of all “funders becom[ing]
more stringent in their requirements.” I postulate that in developing their evaluation practices to
demonstrate their programmatic success, museums may choose to narrow their education
audiences to those most at need within their communities, though that might also increase
associated administrative costs in determining who is most in need.
Evaluation is not only a condition of funding requirements for many museum education
departments, but it is also a way through which educators can reflect on how they can best meet
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community needs. 15 For Shanta Lawson, the “programs [at The Studio Museum in Harlem] have
evolved to continually meet the needs of the community [the Museum] serves,” as evident by the
creation of a venue for senior programming about eight years ago in response to a community
plea. Lawson adds that, industry-wide “museums are waking up to the reality that to be relevant
and get funding they must pay attention” to their communities and try to always increase their
accessibility to the public. At MoMA, too, “experimentation and research of people’s interests”
has been key to informing programming, according to The Edward John Noble Foundation
Deputy Director of Education, Wendy Woon. Optimistically, the Wadsworth Athenaeum
Museum’s Anne Butler Rice highlights the Wadsworth’s Community Engagement Initiative of
2009 as great evidence of museums “do[ing] well to respond to community need[s]” already.
Butler Rice is cognizant, however, of the fact that museum education departments “have a lot
more to do,” which of course reflects the persistent relevancy of museum education.
Despite the positive effects of greater restricted donations, in terms of evaluation and
reflection on community needs, I was interested to learn that museum education departments’
dependence on restricted donations worries many staff members. According to Bruno Nouril, the
Development Director of The Drawing Center, because educational programs are supported
primarily by restricted donations, without those restricted donations they would likely be
vulnerable to cuts in unsuccessful general fundraising years. Due to the changing nature of
philanthropic interests, this means that educational programs could be replaced by other
activities at the whim of museum donors. Lawson echoed this sentiment in recounting how

15

At a time when museums value creating individualized visitor experiences, museum education
departments have been especially tasked with the responsibility of adapting goals to meet the
contemporary criteria of visitors “which can include: social interaction (meeting friends for
drinks, for example), spiritual sustenance, emotional connection, intellectual challenge, or
consumerist indulgence” (Rodney 2016).
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incredibly difficult it was to retain financial support from Target to maintain “Target Free
Sundays” after the corporation’s interests had shifted to support youth education instead of
family access to the arts. For educators like Vas Prabhu, the Education Director of the
Farnsworth Art Museum, the reality that philanthropic interests may shift away from arts
education is daunting but one necessary of overcoming: “we want longevity so we have to think
strategically about how we can continue.” In advocating for the importance of museum education
departments, MoMA’s Wendy Woon, reminds us that museum educators are “the experts at
bringing together art and people,” even though that “expertise is often overlooked” and donors
increasingly demand that their know-how pervades programming. Ultimately contemporary
concerns about the uncertain future of arts education advocacy hinge upon one major question –
will philanthropic and museum interests in arts education remain strong enough to support
museum education departments and their goals of serving an increasingly diverse range of
communities? Additional qualitative and quantitative studies will be able to inform art museum
staff, donors, and the larger philanthropic community of how philanthropic interests influence,
and perhaps even dictate, the priorities of many museums.

VIII. Conclusions
Museums are powerful institutions, “quintessentially hav[ing] the potency to change what
people may know or think or feel, to affect what attitudes they may adopt or display, to influence
what values they form” (Weil 2002 p.39). In the twenty-first century, though museums continue
to play critical roles in society, the philanthropic community that champions those museums is
exerting a greater influence over the prioritization of museum activities by placing restrictions on
how their donations may be used. Following prior research conducted by Yermack (2017), this
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research not only confirms that restricted donations affect museum cost structures, but also
indicates that restricted donations help to improve the performance of museum education
departments by increasing museum education department budgets and enhancing the quality of
educational programming.
Ever since the philanthropic efforts to bolster arts education of the 1970s, museums have
similarly dedicated themselves to providing society with educational experiences through the
arts. The museum education departments that exist today continue to innovate and find ways to
best serve their communities and the interests of their donors. As evident by the positive and
statistically significant effect of greater permanently restricted gifts on the proportion of total
expenses dedicated to educational purposes, an interest in arts education appears to persist in the
twenty-first century. Not only do museums dedicate $18.76 more of total expenses to
educational purposes when an additional $100 of total assets is restricted permanently, but they
also appear to focus on providing quality over quantity, as evident by the fact that when an
additional dollar of total assets is restricted temporarily, museums on average serve fewer school
districts through their educational programs.
Though museum education departments at museums are receiving the financial support they
need to create quality experiences with the arts to meet their communities’ needs in the twentyfirst century, the future of arts education advocacy is still largely unknown. Because the nature of
restricted donations is not disclosed in public reports, this research cannot quantitatively
conclude whether the increase in museum education department budgets when a greater
proportion of total assets are permanently restricted is a result of (1) donations being restricted
specifically to educational purposes or (2) museums shifting their general operating funds toward
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educational programs in response to restricted gifts crowding out museum spending in the
donors’ areas of priority.
The qualitative feedback that I collected from informational interviews with museum
educators across the Northeast suggests that restricted donations seem to be focused primarily
toward educational purposes. In fact, according to many museum educators, the goals of their
museums’ educational programming have been largely dependent on the restricted donations and
partnerships with other institutions, schools, corporations, and funders that their museums have
cultivated. Most bluntly, Rachel Rosen, the Director of Education at the American Folk Art
Museum, even shared that the AFAM’s education department simply “couldn’t have realized
some of their goals without restricted funds.” Similarly, not only have museums realized the
need to serve their direct communities, but their donors have also focused their philanthropic
attention to community needs, with the Target First Saturdays at the Studio Museum in Harlem,
which include free admission for all on select Saturdays, paid for by Target, as one poignant
example of that. While funders become “more stringent in their requirements,” according to
Anne Butler Rice, the Georgette Auerbach Koopman Director of Education at the Wadsworth
Atheneum Museum, they are able to affect how financial resources are allocated to museum
activities.
Ultimately, despite the strong qualitative evidence of donor interests in arts education being
responsible for the prioritization of educational programs, future research should consider
modeling donor behavior and influence. This will be helpful in understanding to what degree
donor interests guide or dominate internal museum interests. Of course, such information will be
relevant to many not-for-profit institutions as they anticipate potential changes in philanthropic
interests. As important philanthropists begin focusing their attention to concerns like social
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justice, not-for-profit institutions may need to reallocate their budgets and reevaluate their
missions to align with the budding philanthropic priorities. To continue receiving funding,
museum education departments at private, independent not-for-profit US art museums may need
to demonstrate their value to society even more.
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X. Appendix
Informational Interview Questions
→ How do you define educational programming? What types of program services
fall under educational programs? What types of program services do not?
→ From your perspective, how has museum educational programming evolved over
recent years?
→ Have you noticed any change to the quantity or quality of your museum’s
educational programs in the past 10 years? If so, what have those changes been
and do you have any idea why those changes were prompted?
→ Presently, what types of goals does your museum have for its educational
programming? And what were the goals 10 years ago?
→ Do you believe your museum’s present educational programs have developed in
response to a community need, a museum goal, a donor suggestion, or perhaps
even a combination of many reasons?
→ How does your museum measure how well the goals of its educational
programming are being met? Does your museum regularly assess its educational
programs? If so, does your museum employ formal techniques (like contracting a
professional evaluator, using a sampling method to survey visitors, and timing
how long visitors engage in a program), informal techniques (like chatting with
guests after a program and jotting down children’s reactions as they participate in
a program), or a mixture of both to evaluate its educational programs?
→ Are your museum’s educational programs evaluated as a condition of funding
requirements?
→ In regards to the financial backing of your museum’s educational programming,
have you noticed any change in your museum’s budget for educational
programming in the past 10 years? If so, what was the change and do you have
any idea why that change was prompted?
→ Do you believe restricted donations have impacted museum educational
programming directly or indirectly at your museum (perhaps in quantity, quality,
evaluation, etc.)? If so how?
→ Can you please share in a few brief words what value museum education
programs bring to the community?
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